Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Natural Law Forum

1-1-1958

Juridical Axiology in Ibero-America;Note
Luis Recasens-Siches

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_forum
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Recasens-Siches, Luis, "Juridical Axiology in Ibero-America;Note" (1958). Natural Law Forum. Paper 32.
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_forum/32

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Natural Law Forum by an authorized
administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

JURIDICAL AXIOLOGY
IN IBERO-AMERICA
In Latin America, as in other parts of the world, the last two decades have
witnessed the development of a widespread and vigorous interest in juridical
axiology. Although this article will be concerned primarily with developments
during the last fifteen years, some mention will be made of earlier contributions
since contemporary work is built on foundations established two or three decades
ago. To the still more remote periods only brief reference will be made.
COLONIAL PERIOD

Throughout the colonial period in Latin America, the Scholastic philosophy
of natural law prevailed both in written works and in university teachings. Some
authors, like Tomis Mercado, a Dominican friar of the sixteenth century in
Mexico, followed the Thomist line strictly. 1 Other writers tended rather to lean
on the Franciscan tradition of Duns Scotus, as in the case of the Guatemalans
Blas Morales and Juan Bautista Alvirez Toledo (1665-1776). Also, the ideas of
the great Spanish theologians and philosophers of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries-Francisco de Vitoria, Bartolom6 Medina, Domingo de Soto, Domingo
BAfiez, Fernando Vizquez de Menchaca, Gabriel V~isquez, Juan de Lugo, and
especially Francisco Su~rez 2 -exercised a far-reaching influence on the philosophy
of natural law in Colonial Spanish America. A good example can be found in
the teachings of the Peruvian Jesuits Alonso de Pefiafiel and NicolAs de Olea,
among others.
During the eighteenth century, in both ecclesiastical colleges and lay circles,
the teaching of natural law drew its inspiration not only from the great Scholastics
but also, and sometimes very strongly, from the ideas of the European Enlightenment, as in the case of the Peruvian Professor Mariano de Vivero, the Mexican
Jesuit Antonio de Peralta,3 and the Guatamalan Franciscan friar Antonio
Liendo y Goicochea 4 (1735-1814).
THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

In the preparatory stages of the Wars of Independence, as well as during and
after the struggle for liberation from Spain, the ideas of the classical school of
natural law, those of Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, and the political thought
1.

Concerning

colonial authors mentioned

in

the text, see Recas~ns-Siches, El Pensa-

miento Filos6fico, Politico, Social y Juridico de Hispano-Amrrica, in the joint book: DEL
VECCHIO, FILOSOFiA DEL DERECHO, and RECAS.Ns-SIcHEs, ESTUDIOS DE FILOSOFIA DEL
DERECHO, Vol. II, U.T.E.H.A. 375 ff. (Mexico, 1946).
2.
See RECASiNS-SICHES, LA FILOSOFfA DEL DERECHO DE FRANCISCO SU"EZ (2nd ed.,

Mexico, 1947); and op. cit. supra, note I at 61-69.
3.

PERALTA, DiSSERTATIONES SCHOLASTICAE;
and jurisprudence.
4.
LIENDO Y GOICOCHEA, DE LEGIBUS.

and, in addition, 14 volumes on theology
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of the American and French Revolutions, all exercised a decisive influence on
5
both theoretical and practical developments in Latin America.
Heineccius' natural law, which to a certain extent summarized the ideas of
the Continental classical school of natural law of Grotius, Althusius, Pufendorf,
Thomasius, and others, was represented by the Argentine priest Gregorio Funes
(1749-1829), who inaugurated a professorship of natural law at the University
of C6rdoba and also taught there.
Rousseau's ideas were disseminated by, inter alia, the Argentine Mariano
Moreno, 6 the Colombian Antonio Narifio,7 the Peruvian Manuel Lorenzo
Vidaurre, the Venezuelans Sim6n Rodriguez (Sim6n Bolivar's teacher) and
Jos6 Vargas,8 and the Cuban priest Felix Varela (1788-1853).
The political and legal thinking of South America's great liberator, Sim6n
Bolivar (1783-1830), was influenced rather by Anglo-American philosophy, with
its emphasis upon, and understanding of, actual historical conditions. 9
The two fathers of Mexican independence, the priests Miguel Hidalgo (17531811) and Jos6 Maria Morelos (1 765-1815), developed a philosophy consisting
of a blend of Scholastic ideas and themes from the French Encyclopaedia. The
same applies to Ignacio Aldama (d. 1811). In the Mexico City "Ayuntamiento,"
or municipal council, there took place in 1803 a heated controversy regarding the
problem of national sovereignty, the outcome of which was the collapse of Viceroy
Iturragaray's rule. It thus happened that the history of colonial thought ended
in precisely the way it had begun; i.e., with a controversy over matters of
natural law.1o
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF LIBERAL THOUGHT
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Generally speaking, it may be said that until the beginning of the last third
of the nineteenth century, liberal trends prevailed in the development of legal
and political thinking. These liberal currents were represented in Mexico by
Jos6 Maria Luis Moral' (1794-1856)-who was also influenced by utilitarianism-Juan Wenceslao Barquera (b. 1779), Friar Servando Teresa de Mier
(1763-1822), Valentin G6mez Farias (1781-1858), and Benito Ju.rez (18061872). In Colombia, liberal thinking was developed mainly by Francisco
Antonio Zeal 2 (1770-1822) and Florentino GonzAlez 13 (1806-1875). In Central
5.

On the authors mentioned in this section, see Recas~ns-Siches, op. cit. supra, note 1.

6.

MORENO, REPRESENTACI6N DE LOS HACENDADOS Y LABRADORES

7.

Narifio set up a group to cultivate the French Revolution ideas, and he became presi-

(1809).

dent of his country.
8. Vargas translated into Spanish RouSSEAU'S SOCIAL CONTRACT (1809).

9.

On Bolivar, see Recasdns-Siches, op. cit. supra, note 1 at 728-735.

10.

See RAMOS, HISTORIA DE LA FILOSOFfA EN MixsCo (Mexico, 1943).

11.
12.

MORA,

13.

F. Gonzilez translated into Spanish John Stuart Mill's works, and wrote LECCIONES

CATECISMO POLiTICO DE LA FEDERACI6N MEXICANA

(1835).

Zea edited a political review, EL CORREO DE ORINOCO (1818-1821).

DE DEREC3O CONSTITUCIONAL (1869)

and LA LiBERTAD CIVIL Y EL GODIERNO PROPIO.
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America, the same direction was followed by Pedro Molina, 14 Jos6 Francisco
Barrundiar 5 (1787-1854), Miguel Larreynaga1 6 (1771-1845), Antonio Jos6 de
Irisarri1 7 (1786-1868), and Lorenzo Montffar 1s (1823-1898).
Outstanding
in the same current in Cuba were Jos6 Agustin Caballero (1771-1835), Jos6 de
la Luz y Cabellero (1800-1862), and Jos6 Antonio Saco 19 (1797-1864). Francisco Bilbao was one of the most prominent liberals in Chile.2 0
Special mention is reserved for the towering figure of Andres Bello 2 l (17811872). Though a native of Caracas, Venezuela, his influence covered all of
South America, and was particularly felt in Chile. His legal philosophy, though
marked by considerable originality, shows the influence of certain ideas of natural
law, utilitarian trends, and some of the thoughts of John Stuart Mill.
We should now look at four significant figures in Argentinian political and
legal thinking of the nineteenth century: Esteban Echeverria 2 2 (1805-1851),
whose social philosophy was in a certain degree suggested by some of the socialist
ideas of Saint-Simon and Pierre Leroux, as well as by the liberal aspects of the
works of Lerminier and Mazzini; Juan Bautista Alberdi2 3 (1810-1884), who
attempted to combine certain basic assumptions of natural law with some of the
tendencies of juridical romanticism; Domingo Fausto Sarmiento (1811-1888),
author of an original synthesis of legal and sociological thought, which reveals the
influence of Tocqueville, Leroux, Guizot, Cousin, Jouffroy, Humboldt, Chateaubriand, and, Villemain; and Fidel Vicente L6pez 24 (1811-1903), creator of a
philosophy of history in which free will and, to some extent, the doctrine of
perfectibility play leading roles.
THE PREDOMINANCE OF SOCIOLOGICAL POSITIVISM

Throughout the last third of the nineteenth century and the first decade of
the twentieth, positivist, evolutionist, and materialist trends prevailed in Latin
American legal and social philosophy. The sociological ideas of Comte, Littr6,
14.

P. Molina edited two periodicals, EL EDITOR CONSTITUCIONAL (1820) and EL GENIO

DE LA LIBERTAD, and wrote MEMORIAS SOBRE LA REVOLUcI6N EN CENTRO-AMERICA.

15. Barrundia promoted the abolition of slavery and stood for freedom of the press. He
left, unpublished, a translation of Milton's Parddise Lost and a biography of Milton.
16. Larreynaga wrote 10 volumes of APUNTES ENCICLOPiDICOS.
17.
Irisarri wrote REFLEXIONES SOBRE LOS GOBIERNOS DE AM-RICA (1813), SOBRE LA
JUSTICIA DE LA REVOLucI6N FN AMiRICA, and successively edited many periodicals in
several countries.
18.

MONT6FAR,

JURISPRUDENCIA

NOCIONES DE DERECHO DE GENTES

USUAL:

EL EVANOELIO

Y EL

SYLLABUS

(1884)

and

(1893).

19.

On these three Cuban thinkers, see RECASiNS-SICHES,

20.

BILBAO,

op. cit. supra, note 1 at 449 ff.

EL ORDEN; LA LEY DE LA HISTORIA.

21.
Among Bello's numerous writings-OBRAS COMPLETAS (Santiago de Chile, 18811893)-are FILOSOFfA DEL DERECHO; PROYECTO DE C6DIGO CIVIL DE CHILE; and TRATADO
DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL.

22.

ECHEVERRiA, DOGMA SOCIALISTA.
ALBERDI,
FRAGMENTO PRELIMINAR AL ESTUDIO DEL DERECHO (1837); BASES Y
PUNTO DE PARTIDA PARA LA OROANIZACI6N POLiTICA DE LA REP6BLICA ARGENTINA (1852);

23.

and PEREGRINACI6N DE Luz DEL DfA EN AMiRICA.

24.

L6PEZ, MEMORIA SOBRE LOS RESULTADOS GENERALES CON QUE LOS PUEBLOS ANTIGUOS HAN CONTRIBUIDO A LA CIVILIZACI6N DE LA HUMANIDAD (1845).
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Tarde, Durckheim, Worms, Darwin, Spencer, and Haeckel constituted the dominant tendencies in Latin America, but most especially in Brazil, Chile, Argentina,
Cuba, and Mexico. This meant, of course, that all references to natural law
were rejected a priori; it also meant that legal philosophy, as such, disappeared
25
and was replaced by sociological studies and empirical planning.
During the four decades in which sociological positivism predominated, there
were still a few thinkers who maintained intact their devotion to the axiological
philosophy of law. Unfortunately, their voices were scarcely heard, their influence was minute, and their works found little or no echo. On the one hand,
a tradition of natural law continued to exist among a few Catholic writers, such
27
as the Chilean Rafael FernAndez Concha 2 6 and the Cuban Mariano Aramburo
(1870-1941). On the other hand, a conception of natural law, largely inspired
by the ideas of the Enlightenment, with a strong liberal trend, continued to be
held by some distinguished scholars; for example, the Brazilian Tobias Barreto 2s
(1839-1889), who, in spite of the influence of certain evolutionist trends, still
professed a philosophy of free will (with Kantian overtones) and a legal axiology
that was historically flexible; the Cuban Jose Calixto Bernal 29 (1804-1886),
rationalistically and democratically minded; and Manuel Vicente Villarin, 30 of
Peru, professor of natural law at the University of San Marcos in Lima. In
addition to the rather weak survival of these two schools of natural law, a third
must be recalled: the Krausist natural law, 3 1 which, after a brilliant flowering in
Spain, had some followers in Ibero-America. 3 2 Among these were Antonio
Bachiller Morales3 3 (1812-1899), of Cuba, Juan Jos6 de la Garza, Jos6 Maria
del Castillo Velasco, and Hilario Gailondo 34 -the three of Mexico-Jos6 R.
Mas,35 of Bolivia, Jo~o Teoduro Xavier, 3 6 of Brazil, and Jos6 Silva Santisteban,
of Peru.
EARLy REVIvALs OF IDEAS OF NATURAL LAW

Just as in Continental Europe, the renewed preoccupation with natural law

began in Hispanic America with developments along the lines of Rudolf Stamm25. See KUNZ, LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN THE TWENTIETH
3-16 (New York, 1950).
26. FERNANDEZ CONCHA, TRATADO DE FILOSOFiA DEL DERECHO o DERECHO
PARA SERVIR DE INTRODUCCION A LAS CIENCIAS LEGALES (1887).
27.

CENTURY
NATURAL

ARAMBURO, FILOSOFIA DEL DERECHO (New York, 1924-1928).

28.

BARRETO, QUEST6ES VIGENTES DE FILOSOFIA E DE DIREITO (Pernambuco, 1880).
29. BERNAL, TEORfA DE LA AUTORIDAD APLICADA A LAS NACIONES MODERNAS (1856);
TRATADO PoLfTIcO; EL DERECHO (1877).
30. VILLAR;N, PROGRAMA DE DERECHO NATURAL y PRINCIPIOS GENERALES DE LEOISLAcI6N, CUESTIONES GENERALES SOBRE EL ESTADO Y EL GOBIERNO (1935).
31.
KRAUSE, DAS SYSTEM DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (1874).
Krause's principal disciples

were Ahrens, Leonardi, Schliepacke, and Roeder in Germany, and Tiberghien in Belgium.
32. On the Spanish Krausist School, see RECASiNS-SICHES, op. cit. supra, note 1 at
332-343.
33. BACHILLER MORALES, ELEMENTOS DE FILOSOFfA DEL DERECHO 0 CURSO DE DERECHO
NATURAL (1857.)

34.

These three Mexican scholars were influenced by Tiberghien.

35.

MAS,

NoCIONES ELEMENTALES DE DERECHO NATURAL

(1879).
36. XAVIER,

TEORIA TRANSCENDENTAL

DO DIREITO

(1876).

o

FILOSOF&A DEL DERECHO
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ler's legal philosophy, and also under the inspiration of Giorgio del Vecchio's
works. As is well known, Starnmler, who was decisively influenced by the NeoKantian School of Marburg, drew up a doctrine of natural law with variable
content. He held that, whereas the idea of justice is only one, absolutely valid,
universal, and unchangeable, the social realities that must be ordered and shaped
by that idea of justice are many and variable. Therefore, according to Stammler,
while the idea of justice is absolute, there is an almost infinite number of patterns
of "just law," according to actual historical conditions, which are different in each
situation, in each social reality, and in each epoch. Giorgio del Vecchio, who was
to some extent influenced by Fichte's philosophy, but also by the Scholastic
doctrine of jus naturae,created a philosophy of the normative principles of human
nature as a basis for natural law and accomplished a most fruitful analysis of
the idea of justice.
These views of Stammler and Del Vecchio were accepted as foundations by
some Ibero-American scholars, who first sought to overcome the positivist negation
and to restore the philosophy of natural law, or juridical axiology. In Argentina,
Stammler's doctrines inspired the legal philosophy of Enrique Martinez Paz 37
(1882-1950), a professor at the University of C6rdoba, and Alberto J. Rodriguez 3S
(1894-1937), a professor at the University of Buenos Aires. The teachings of
another professor at the latter university and at the same time, Mario Sienz, 39
were a sort of personal re-elaboration of the theories of Del Vecchio. In Cuba,
Pablo Desvernine attempted to build a new approach to Stamnler's Neo-Kantian
natural law. Later this same trend was followed, in certain respects, by Emilio
Fernmndez Camus 40 and Antonio Sinchez Bustamante y Montoro,4 1 professors
at the University of Havana, although the latter raised some objections to the
interpretation given by Stammler to Kant's transcendental method as applied to
legal philosophy. Also partly influenced by Stanmler was the work of the Mexican professor, Juan Jos6 Bremer, who, in addition, attempted to go further
towards what he called an integral theory of law. Not particularly concerned
with law, but rather primarily with general axiology and ethics, are some outstanding works written by the Mexican professor Francisco Larroyo,4 2 who has
drawn up a somewhat individual elaboration of Neo-Kantian idealism, influenced
not only by the Marburg current, but also and more vigorously by the Baden
37.
38.

MARTiNEZ

PAZ,

RODRiGUEZ,

(1932); EL
DERECHO

EL

SISTEMA

DE FILoSOFfA

CONCEPTO

DE

DEL

LA FILOSOFIA

DERECHO
DEL

(1932).

DERECHO

DE

STAMMLER;

RECASi NS-SICHES

DERECHO (1939).
39. S ENZ, FILOSOFfA DEL DERECHO

Y

LOS

"TEMAS"

(1927); LA Posici6N

FILOSOFfA DEL DERECHO
SANCHEZ

NUEVAS

LA JUSTICIA

LA

FILOSOFIA

DEL

(1930).
(1932);

LECCIONES

DE

(1945).

BUSTAMANTE

POSICIONES

DE

DIDACTICA DE LA FILOSOFiA

DEL DERECHO EN LA ENSERANZA UNIVERSITARIA Y EN LA VIDA
40. FERNANDEZ CAMUS, FILOSOFIA JURIDICA CONTEMPORANEA

41.

(1927);

PRESENTE Y EL PORVENIR DE LA FILOSOFiA DEL DERECHO; LA FILOSOFiA DEL

EN

MONTORO,

Y

LA

STAMMLER:

FILOSO~fA DEL

ENSAYO

DERECHO

DE VALORACI6N

(1933);

TEORiA

(1931);

GENERAL DEL

DERECHO (1939).

42.

LARROYO, Los

PRINCIPIOS

LIZAcI6N DE LA MORALIDAD
CRfTICA DEL

PERSONALISMO

DE

(1937);

LA

ETICA

SOCIAL:

CONCEPTO,

LA FILOSOFfA DE LOS VALORES

ESPIRITUALISTA DE NUESTRO TIEMPO

AXIOLOGfA

(1936);
(1941).

Y

REA-

ExPosIci6N Y
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School (Windelband and Natorp). The work of Guillermo H6ctor Rodriguez, 4 3
also a Mexican professor, is concerned with developing a legal philosophy on the
basis of the ideas of Hermann Cohen. Some account of the work of Juan
Manuel Tern Mata, who initially was inspired by Neo-Kantianism, will be
given later in this article.
NEo-SCHoLASTic NATURAL LAW BETWEEN

1920

AND

1945

Neo-Scholastic philosophy of law in Ibero-America has developed along two
lines, sometimes related to one another. The first is based upon a thorough study
of classical texts-something which did not happen in the nineteenth century.
The second constitutes an attempt at renewal through contact with twentieth
century philosophies. Some Neo-Thomist writers welcome the new philosophical
tendencies, particularly phenomenology, Scheler's axiology, and even some trends
of Catholic existentialism. Most Neo-Scholastic writers follow Thomist lines,
although there are some who seek inspiration in Saint Augustine.
Among those in Argentina who have been concerned with Neo-Thomist
philosophy of law, particular mention should be made of the following: Toms
D. Casares,44 Octavio N. Derisi, 4 5 Ismael Quiles, S.J.,46 Faustino Leg6n, 4 7
Eduardo M. Lustosa,48 Manuel Rio,4 9 and, perhaps most important of all,
Alfredo Fragueiro.50 Taking as his point of departure the most dynamic thoughts
of Scholastic legal philosophy, Fragueiro has devised a natural law of progressive
content, which, starting from the individual conscience, looks to God as its true
foundation and source. Natural law is a continuous and progressive rational
activity which sets up goals and chooses appropriate means, insofar as it develops
and increases the individual's potential. Fragueiro has also contributed a doctrine
of freedom, in which he differentiates between essential freedom, belonging to any
individual insofar as he is aware of his own individuality, and real freedom,
belonging to the concrete personality insofar as the latter has achieved some
development of its personality. Only he is really free who has succeeded in ruling
his own conduct. The same principles must be applied to communities: a community is free only if the spiritual prevails over the material. True democracy
presupposes actual freedom, founded upon spiritual development. In the present
crisis of our culture we need to assert the primacy of the spiritual: a purely
43. RODRiGUEZ, FUNDAMENTACIr6N DE LA JURISPRUDENCIA COMO CIENCIA EXACTA (1937);
ETICA COMO JURISPRUDENCIA: PUNTO DE PARTIDA Y PIEDRA DE TOQUE DE LA ETICA (1947).
44. CASARES, EL DERECHO Y LA JUSTICIA (1935).
45. DERISI, FUNDAMENTOS METAFiSICOS DEL ORDEN MORAL (1940).
46. QUILES, LA PERSONA HUMANA (1942).
47. LEO6N, AFIRMACIONES DE ORTODOXIA Y POLiTICA (1930).
48. LUSTOSA, CONCEPTO CRISTIANO DEL ESTADO (1938).
49. Rio, PERSPECTIVAS ACTUALES DEL DERECHO NATURAL (1939); LAS ESPECIES DEL
SABER

JURfDICO

(1943);

ESTUDIO

DE

LA

LIBERTAD

HUMANA:

ANTHROPOS

Y ANAKt

(1955).
50. FRAGUERO, DEMOCRACIA Y ORDEN POLftIcO (1930); EL DERECHO NATURAL EN LA
OBRA DE F. GiNY (1931); LiBERTAD Y AUTORIDAD (1933); JACQUES MARITAIN (1937);
DERECHO NATURAL DR 'CONTENIDO PROGRESIVO (1939); CIVILIZAcI6N Y CULTURA
LA LIBERTAD EN RELACI6N A LA PERSONA Y A LA PERSONALIDAD (1944).

(1944);

141
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technical civilization is possible, but culture without religious faith is impossible.
In Mexico, Neo-Scholastic philosophy of law has developed more and more
5
brilliantly. Though he is not himself a jurist, Oswaldo Robles, has been the
central figure in the Neo-Scholastic philosophical movement in Mexico. Without
any exclusivism and in an open-minded -way, Ignacio Bravo Betancourt (18751944), in his teaching on legal philosophy at the National University of Mexico,
52
strongly favored Neo-Thomit trends. Daniel Kuri Brefia, who has completed
an analysis of the idea of the common good, has made important contributions
to Neo-Thomist legal, social, and political philosophy. The Neo-Thomist current
is followed by many other Mexican legal thinkers, among them Manuel Ulluoa
3

Ortiz,5

4
Hdctor
Gabriel Garcia Rojas, 5

57

56

Gonzilez

Uribe, 55 Alfonso Zahar

Vergara, and David Casares Nicolin.
Antonio G6mez Robledo,5 8 an outstanding figure in Mexican Neo-Scholasticism, in spite of being substantially a Neo-Thomist, has been strongly influenced by Saint Augustine and by the great Spanish masters of the golden age.
A vigorous Augustinian trend is perceptible in several works of Jos6 Fuentes
Mares, 59 Dean of the University of Chihuahua Law School, who produced some
excellent studies on several subjects of legal and political philosophy and has
firmly opposed Kantian philosophy.
The most prominent leader of Neo-Scholastic philosophy of law in Mexico,
however, is Rafael Preciado Hernindez. Very important also are the contributions of Jos6 M. Gallegos Rocafull and of Francisco GonzAlez Diaz Lombardo.
An account of the works of these three authors will be given here in the part
devoted to the description of the recent developments of Neo-Scholasticism.
During this period, and within the Neo-Scholastic current, mention must be
made of Francisco Vives 60 and Eduardo Hamilton, 6 1 both of Chile; Carracciolo
Parra Le6n 62 and Juan Francisco Quijano, 6 3 both of Venezuela; Pedro Maria

51.

EL TOMISMO

ROBLES,

VIVIENTE

(1937);

ESQUEMA DE ANTROPOLOGiA

FILOs6PIcA

(1942); PROPEDiUTICA FILOS6FICA (1943).

52.

KURI BRERA, LA ESENCIA DEL DERECHO Y LOS VALORES JURfDICOS
Y POLTICA: ENSAYO SOBRE FILOSOFiA SOCIAL (1942).

(1939);

HOMBRE

(1943).

53.

ULLUOA ORTIZ, NOTAS EN TORNO DEL DERECHO NATURAL

54.

GARCiA ROJAS,

55.

56.

GONZALEZ URIBE, INTRODUCCION A LA TEORfA DEL ESTADO.
ZAHAR VERGARA, LA FILOSOFiA DE LA LEY SEGUN DOMINGO SOTO

57.

CASARES NiCOLiN,

DERECHOS DEL HOMBRE Y DERECHOS DEL GRUPO

58.

G6MEZ ROBLEDO,

POLfTICA DE VITORIA (1940); CRISTIANISMO Y FILOSOF&, EN LA
(1942); EL ORiGEN DEL PODER POLiTICO SEGUiN FRANCISCO

EXPERIENCIA

SOBRE LA

INDEFINICION DEL DERECHO

(1938).
(1947).
(1942).

AGUSTINIANA

Su;REz (1948).
FUENTES MARES,

LA NocI6N AOUSTINIANA DE LA GUERRA Y DR LA PAZ (1941);
MEDITACIONES SOBRE LA LIBERTAD (1941); APUNTES PARA UNA IDEA DEL DERECHO COMO
(1942); LA NOcI6N DE LEY NATURAL (1942);
SUPERESTRUCTURA DE LA NATURALEZA

59.

LEY,

SOCIEDAD

Y

POLfTICA:

ENSAYO

PARA

UNA

VALORACI6N

DE

LA DOCTRINA

DE

SAN

AGUSTIN (1943); KANT, FIL6SOFO DEL ESTADO MODERNO (1944).
60. VIVES, FILOSOFiA DEL DERECHO (2nd ed., 1941).

61.

HAMILTON, FAMILIA Y ESTADO

62.

PARRA LE6N, FILOSOFfA UNIVERSITARIA.

63.

QUIJANO,

(1916).

CONCLUSIONES

(1933).

JURDICAS

DE LA ACADEMIA,

EL LIczo

Y LA ESCOLSTICA
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Carrefio, 64 of Colombia, who considers that the philosophy of law should include
an introduction to natural law; Jos6 Alejandro Bermidez, 65 also of Colombia,
who vigorously attacks the Hegelian and Marxian deification of the state, and
defends the human ideals of wisdom, justice, and charity, as embodied in
Catholicism; and Manuel Vicente VillarAn, 66 a great liberal from Peru, who
succeeds in synthesizing Christian principles with modem trends, looking towards
social justice.
The most outstanding Neo-Scholastic thinker in this period in Brazil is Alceu
Amoroso de Lima, who writes under the pen name of Tristdo de Athayde 6 7 : his
thought first derived from Spencer and to some extent from Nietzsche, but later
was decisively influenced by Jacques Maritain's philosophy.
Jackson de Figuereido, also of Brazil, who started from evolutionist positivism
and underwent a transitory phase of Neo-Kantianism, 6 8 finally became fully converted to Catholicism. His political and legal philosophy is not, however, inspired
by Thomist ideas, but principally by the most reactionary thinking close to the
opinions of the writers of "L'Action Fran~aise" (Maurras, etc.). This last period
of his philosophy is authoritarian, and against democracy and freedom.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

OF NATURAL LAW ON NEo-THOMIST

AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

Rafael Preciado Hemindez (b. 1908),69 one of the several professors of legal
philosophy at the National University of Mexico, is considered today the outstanding Ibero-American Neo-Thomist in this field. Within this current he shows
a great flexibility in assimilating many of the contributions of modem and contemporary philosophy. Commenting upon his principal work, Josef L. Kunz
has stated : 69a
This book, while Neo-Thomistic in an orthodox way, is, nevertheless, a modem
book. The author takes into critical consideration not only all the modem
philosophies of law to which he is opposed; he is also influenced by modem
Neo-Thomistic thinkers, particularly French, such as Maritain and
Garrigou-Lagrange, by modem philosophers such as Scheler, by modern
Catholic jurists such as Corts Grau, G~ny, Le Fur, Dabin, and, particularly,
by the French Institutionalist School (Renard, Delos). The book is modem in
its repudiation of the "classical natural law," in the restriction of the
contents of natural law, in its opposition to a dualism of and rivalry between
a natural and a positive legal order, in the insistence on the basically ethical
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character of the so-called natural law, in the author's longing for an "integral"
philosophy of law. The book, finally, illustrates the nearness, in modem
philosophy of law, between Neo-Thomistic philosophy of law and philosophers
of law who do not belong to the Neo-Thomistic School.
Preciado Hemndez emphasizes that legal philosophy 'has a threefold mission:
for legal science; for social life and political tasks; and for the professional jurist.
A correct philosophy of law contributes decisively to the improvement of the
legal order, of society, and of the men who compose it.
The author thinks that for methodological reasons law must be studied from
three different viewpoints: logical, phenomenological, and deontological. None
of these three viewpoints, however, provide us with a correct idea of law, because
law possesses these three dimensions: logical, factual, and ethical. Law is not
simply a bare technique, but a very special method for applying supreme principles of men's living together in society. These supreme principles lend dignity
to a positive legal order and bind it ethically to the universal order of God.
Like most contemporary legal philosophers, Preciado HemAndez differentiates
between religious norms, which impose obligations of justice for the sake of our
fellow men and society, and moral norms, tending toward the improvement of
man, individually considered, for his personal good, for his own sanctity. Is it
possible to speak of a Christian legal philosophy? On the one hand, from a
historical point of view, the answer is yes. On the other hand, the basic ideas
of dignity, equality, and liberty, which actually were made clear by Christianity,
can be attained and justified by purely rational methods.
Man is characterized by free will, whose formal object is the pursuit of the
good. As to the problem of hierarchy among the various "bona" and values, and
among the ends of human conduct, Preciado HemAndez sustains the primacy of
the spiritual over the corporeal. In addition, we must admit that within the
spiritual realm, those values basic to the person's morality are higher than other
values which function only as a means (utilitarian) to their attainment.
The good is not something independent of the being, but is a notion inherent
in the being; i.e., the good is the being in relation to its final cause, the being
insofar as it makes its potentialities actual. Man, like all other created beings,
has an inherent end, which he tends to realize: he tends to better himself, to improve himself, to realize all his potentialities. Among all the values to be realized
by man, moral good has primacy over pleasurable and utilitarian values, because
man is intelligent and free, and is able to perfect or degrade himself.
There are three basic juridical values: the common good, justice, and legal
security.
Preciado Hemindez regards the common good as a complex notion. First
of all, it means the treasure of human values which have been accumulated by a
certain society and which can be distributed among individuals. It also means
what is common, and not possessed by individuals before they are integrated in
a community. It is, in this sense, something specifically societal, something to be
thought of in connection with social order, law, authority, political organization,
national unity, social peace.
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The author defines justice in the traditional way, as harmony or proportionality which refers to that which is due to everyone.
Legal security involves the idea of a legal order that is just and effective. Consequently, there can be no opposition between legal security, justice, and the
common good.
Natural law, according to Preciado Hemindez, is neither merely our feeling
for justice, nor an ideal code. Natural law is the overall set of rational criteria
and principles-supreme, evident, universal-which preside and rule over a truly
human organization of human life and give it inherent finality, according to the
ontological requirements of man. Consequently, natural law provides the basis
for selecting the technical rules and institutions that enable man to achieve that
finality within a concrete society. But Preciado HemAndez rejects Renard's idea
of natural law as a mere set of criteria for orientation which lead to a progressive
content. He believes that natural law, though it is not a code consisting of universal and invariable norms, includes the supreme criteria that must regulate
social existence, as well as the principles which are necessary to organize human
living together on the basis of man's nature-rational, free, and social.
Agustin Basave FernAndez del Valle, 70 a young professor at the University
of Nuevo Le6n (Monterrey, Mexico), has already proved to be an outstanding
and original thinker. Deeply influenced by the tradition of Christian philosophy,
he has also drawn much inspiration from twentieth century ideas. He has
succeeded in bringing about an original metaphysical doctrine of man, a philosophical anthropology, which to a certain extent may be considered as a new
form of Catholic existentialism connected with some Augustinian and Thomist
thoughts. To live is to feel the contingency and misery of our spirit in its earthly
condition and to anticipate the plenitude of subsistence in the path toward God.
The emotions of anguish and hope are inseparable. This psychological dichotomy
has a corresponding dichotomy in the ontological field: metaphysical helplessness,
or abandon, on the one hand, and substantial plenitude, on the other. These
two dimensions combine into a sort of counterpoint. In the ens-contingens which
man is, there is one perspective toward nothingness, and another toward the
absolute. On this theme Basave elaborates a new metaphysics of human life,
which cannot be summarized here because it includes many philosophical
subtleties incapable of being expressed in a concise form. Basave has also contributed a philosophical theory of the state-fundamentals of political philosophy
-which, in addition to a series of philosophical analyses and definitions (of the
state, its components, its structure, its government, etc.), offers some basic concepts of legal philosophy of Thornist inspiration. He believes in natural law,
conceived as a set of rules prescribed by God for man, which are knowable by
human reason and consistent with human nature. The rules enunciate, regulate,
and delimit man's free activity, insofar as it is necessary for harmoniously attaining
the individual and collective ends in social life.
The existence of natural law is demonstrated, according to Basave, by three
70. BASAVE FERNANDEZ DEL VALLE, TEORfA DEL ESTADO: FUNDAMENTOS DE LA FILOSOFiA
POLfTICA (Mexico, 1955); FILOSO~fA DEL HOMBRE (Mexico, 1957).
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arguments: psychological, or furnished by inner experience; historical, as testified
by a belief which is constant among all peoples and throughout all times; and
rational, insofar as natural law is absolutely necessary for human society, because
otherwise positive law would lack any force of obligation. Though the principles
of natural law are immutable, Basave, following 'Su.rez' doctrine, holds that
their application to diverse social conditions engenders, as consequences, different
norms. The state in its legislation is bound to obey the principles of natural law.
The state must recognize, define, and implement natural law, specifying the consequences to which it gives rise when applied to concrete situations. The authority
of the state must appraise and evaluate the concrete reality which conditions the
legal regulation, as well as take into account the requirements of the common
good. These prudent judgments, however, must develop within the framework of
natural law. Basave holds a personalist doctrine: law, state, and authority must
always be in the service of the human person. Man has a free will. Authority,
which of course is necessary, must be a means to protect and regulate freedom.
Liberty, however, does not imply the legal right to act according to one's whim,
but to be free to do what one ought to do. The state must never interfere with
fundamental rights of man, which are the instrument for complying with man's
ends, or with any form of legitimate spontaneity of individuals or of groups.
Mention must also be made of the young professor Francisco Gonzilez Diaz
Lombardo 7l (National University of Mexico, Mexico City), who in his work
develops a legal philosophy oriented in both Neo-Thomist sources and twentieth
century ideas. He outlines an integral philosophy of law, which comprises
juridical epistemology; speculative philosophy or ontology of juristics, including
a juridical Weltanschauung, a juridical anthropology, a juridical theology, a
juridical philosophy of history, and a philosophy of legal history; and a practical
philosophy of law, which deals with legal values and purposes. Security, common
good, and justice are the fundamental values for the law. The author, while
following the traditional Thomist line, has benefited from some contemporary
philosophies.
Father Jose Gallegos Rocafull, 7 2 professor at the School of Philosophy of the

National University of Mexico, has contributed several first-rate studies on the
political, social, and legal doctrines of the great Spanish theologians and philosophers of the golden centuries.
In Chile natural law doctrine is represented by several scholars. Maximo
Pacheco G6mez,7 3 a brilliant professor of jurisprudence at the University of Chile
(Santiago) who has been influenced in his teachings by the ideas of Giorgio del
Vecchio and this writer, has made an important contribution to Catholic political
71. GONZALEZ DfAz LOMBARDO, INTRODUCCION A LOS PROBLEMAS DE LA FILOSOFIA DEL
DERECHO (Mexico, 1956); CONSrDERACIONES GENERALES SOERE LA DIMENSI6N HiST6RMCA
DEL DERECHO (Mexico, 1956).
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LOS SIOLOS DE ORO (Mexico, 1946); LA DOCTRINA POLITiCA DEL P. FRANCISCO SUAREZ
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73.

PACHECO G6MEZ, POLfrICA, ECONOMifA Y CRISTIANISMO (Santiago, 1947); INTRODUCcI6N AL ESTUDIO DE LAS CIENCIAS JURIDICAS Y SOCIALES (Santiago, 1951).

NATURAL LAW FORUM

146

74
philosophy. Another professor of the same university, Jorge Iv.n Hubner Gallo,
adheres to the Neo-Scholastic natural law, as developed by Cathrein and Rommen. Mention must be made also of the following professors of legal philosophy
at the Catholic University of Chile (Santiago) : Julio Philippi Izquierdo7 5 (18721954), Carlos Dominguez Casanueva, and Rafael Hemndez Samaniego. Mention
must be made also of Jaime Ross 7 6 and of Julio Ruiz Bourgeois, a Christian
existentialist.
Outstanding in the philosophy of law is Father Luis Negr6n Dubuc, Dean of
the Law School of the University of Los Andes (M6rida, Venezuela). Though
basically a follower of the best and most flexible tradition of natural law, he has
been deeply influenced by twentieth century legal philosophies.
At the present time in Cuba, Neo-Thomist legal philosophy is represented by
two judges. One of them, Miguel F. MArquez, 77 has contributed several firstrate studies on various themes, among them Christian humanism as the basic
value criterion for politics and laws; the axiological requirements of the human
person, as inspiration for the developments of the law; the social function of
property; legality and justice; and the sense of liberty according to St. Thomas.
The other judge mentioned above, Juan Jos6 Exp6sito Casas6s, 78 an enthusiastic
disciple of Mariano de Aramburo, has written on some subjects of legal philosophy.
He thinks that the concept of law is essentially bound to the idea of justice.
Natural law pertains to the realm of conceptual ideality and guides human
relations toward the common good and justice.
Very important is the contribution of Cayetano Betancur, 79 Colombian professor, who, substantially a follower of Neo-Thomist trends, is, however, strongly
influenced by some contemporary philosophers, especially by Husserl's phenomenology and Scheler's theory of values, to the point that he considers the latter as
the philosopher of our time richest in ideas and suggestions. Recently, Betancur

has written a valuable Introduction to the Science of Law, in which he announces

that a new spirit will develop in the world toward a better embodiment of Christian humanism, seeking for an effective solution to the problems of social coexistence.
Professor Abel Naranjo Villegas,S0 also of Colombia, follows a similar line. He
harmonizes the principal ideas of Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy with some
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trends of the twentieth century, especially with some doctrines of Max Scheler.
Though he approves of several of Scheler's theses, he warns of the danger of
establishing a pure axiological theory without looking for a metaphysical -foundation, which must be rooted in the real being, such as it was understood by Aristotle and St. Thomas. Betancur stands for an axiological humanistic personalism.
Rafael Carrillo, 8 1 another Colombian professor, shows a vigorous influence of
contemporary German philosophy-from Husserl, through Scheler and Hartmann,
to Heidegger. In the field of legal philosophy he has gone far beyond the limits
of Kelsen's pure theory of law; he has demonstrated that Kelsen's "basic norm"
needs a further foundation and justification in a realm of values.
On the other hand, Jaime V61ez Sienz, 82 also a Colombian professor, has
contributed a criticism of the theory of value of Scheler and Hartmann. The
fact and the meaning of value can be fully understood only in the light of the
"real relationships," which appear when things enter into mutual contact in the
field of existence. The value of an ethical action consists of the relationship of
coherence, or concordance, "between the content of such action and the objective
situation." Values always presuppose objective relationships between various
beings: accordance, harmony, agreement, concordance, complement, consonance,
etc.
Carlos Azcirate y Rosell, 83 a Cuban judge, has contributed a series of studies
on legal philosophy, among them one on juridical axiology in which he stands for
a humanistic (personalist) thesis and develops its consequences for judicial
practice.
Emilio Men6ndez, 84 a justice of the Cuban Supreme Court, has written several
important studies of legal philosophy. Some of them are devoted to juridical
axiology in which he offers a development of value considerations, inspired by
a sort of democratic humanism, and presents new perspectives for future developments of the law.
Fernando AlvArez Tabio, 85 also a Cuban judge, has written at least two
interesting studies, one on human rights, the other on the relationship between
justice and legal security.
Lino Rodriguez Arias Bustamante, 86 a professor of private law and jurisprudence at the University of Panama, combines the spirit of Christian ideals
with several ideas of twentieth century philosophies. In some of his works he aims
at harmonizing the law with the requirements of present social conditions. He
emphasizes that man is always, and necessarily, a member of legal communities,
which, while imposing upon him many obligations, enable him to develop his
potentialities, and, consequently, to increase his real freedom.
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Juan Bautista Lavalle,8 7 formerly professor of legal philosophy at the University of San Marcos, Perd, at first was sympathetic to the theories of Vanni.
Later, however, he evolved toward a flexible philosophy of natural law. If there
were no objective axiology, he says, then state and law would lack any true
foundation.

Jose Le6n BarandiarAn, 88 the president of this university and an outstanding
professor of private law, also gives courses on jurisprudence in which he develops
an axiological doctrine. Mention should be made also of the Peruvian professor,
Mario Alzamora Vald6s, who, in his teachings of legal philosophy at the University of San Marcos, expounds a juridical axiology strongly influenced by Del
Vecchio and by this writer.
Also to be noted is the contribution made to legal philosophy by Francisco
Mir6 Quesada,S 9 professor at the University of San Marcos. He is famous
principally for his work in the field of formal logic of the law. As to problems of
values, he tends to an objectivistic doctrine.
Very rich in important ideas are the numerous contributions made to legal
theory and philosophy by Rafael Rojina Villegas,9 0 a professor at the National
University of Mexico and a justice of the Mexican Supreme Court.
Luis
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AXIOLOGY

Luis Recas~ns-Siches 9 l (b. 1903), author of this article, a professor at the National University of Mexico, though he highly esteems the Scholastic natural law
doctrine-especially Suirez' elaboration and the modem views of Renard-and
has taken some inspiration from these sources, is not himself a Neo-Thomist. His
views in general philosophy were shaped mainly under the direct influence of the
great Spanish philosopher Jos6 Ortega y Gasset, along the line of the so-called
"metaphysics of vital reason," a ratio-vitalistic philosophy of life-a sort
of existentialism, not pessimistic or nihilistic, but optimistic and full of hope,
which is quite compatible with Christian faith.
In my writings on legal philosophy I have dealt not only with axiological
problems but also with questions of general theory of law, which I construct on
87.

LAVALLE,

FILOSOFiA DEL DERECHO

JURfDICA (Lima,

88.

(1914);

FILOSOFfA DEL DERECHO Y DOCENCIA

1939).

LAON BARANDIARAN,

EL DERECHO Y EL ARTE

(1940);

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, CAMPE6N

DE LA JUSTICIA (1941).

Msx6 QUESADA, CURSO DE MORAL (Lima, 1940); L6GICA JURfDICA (Lima, 1956).
90. ROJINA VILLEGAS, INTRODUCCI6N Y TEORfA FUNDAMENTAL DEL DERECHO Y DEL
EsTADo (Mexico, 1944); TEORfA JURfDICA DE LA CONDUCTA (Mexico, 1947); INTRODUCCION AL ESTUDIO DEL DERECHO (1949).
91. RECASENS-SICHES, VIDA HUMANA, SOCIEDAD Y DERECHO (1st ed., Mexico, 1940; 3rd
89.

ed., 1952) ; Human Life, Society, and Law, included in LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
(Twentieth Century Legal Philosophy Series, Harvard University Press, 1948); ESTUDIOS
DE FILOSOsfA DEL DERECHO (3rd ed., U.T.E.H.A., Mexico, 1946); NUEVA FILOSOFfA DE
LA INTERPRETACION DEL DERECHO (Fondo de Cultura Economica, Mexico, 1956); Ideas

and Historical Conditioning in the Realization of Juridical Values, in INTERPRETATIONS
OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND (Oxford University Press, New York, 1947).

LUIS RECAStNS-SICHES
an ontological basis: law-human or positive law-belongs to the realm of
objectivated human life, a better name for the ontological definition of culture.
It is a human and, consequently, historic product, which constitutes a normative
form of a collective character. Thus, law consists of a complex of meanings
of a teleological structure, with a normative form, and intentionally directed
toward certain values. The concrete contents of these meanings, however, are
historical: the human interpretation of certain values, conditioned by the
particular situation. This normative form of life is not individual, but collective,
abstract, functional.
I distinguish, first, between law and morals. Morals evaluate conduct from
the absolute viewpoint of man's supreme end, of the individual's authentic destiny.
Law, on the other hand, is concerned with a person's conduct from the standpoint
of its effects on other persons and purports merely to organize social coexistence
and cooperation, being not the intimate conscience but the external web in which
human interrelations develop. Whereas morals require freedom for their
fulfillment, law may be imposed forcibly.
Secondly, I distinguish between law and the rules of social behavior (conventions). The rules of social behavior, though they have the status of norms
and most frequently are provided with sanctions, can never be enforced. Law,
however, is essentially characterized by its capability of enforcing in an inexorable
manner the proper performance of conduct, or a substitute sanction provided
in the norm itself.
Thirdly, I distinguish between law and arbitrariness. Whereas arbitrary mandate is one which is not founded on a general principle, applicable to all analogous
cases, but responds to a simple because, to a caprice or whim, legal mandate is
founded on objective norms or criteria which have validity for all similar cases.
I maintain that if justice and the other highest juridical values are indeed the
axiological criteria which should form the basic inspiration of the law, and under
which this must be judged, the law, positive or human, is engendered by the need
for some certainty and security in social relations. Nevertheless, there is an
illusion in exaggerating certainty and security, for these can be attained only to
a relative extent.
As to juridical axiology, or valuation, I have sought to establish a sound
foundation for it that will withstand critical examination. To this purpose, I have
emphasized the necessity for proceeding with due order.
The very first problem consists in asking whether the search for juridical
values does or does not make sense, whether all that can be said upon the problems of social life is contained in historic, positive norms, or if, on the other hand,
it is possible to pass judgment on these problems from a viewpoint distinct from
positive law. The answer is definitely yes; the search for juridical values has
meaning. The analysis of the essential meaning of the law proves that the
positivist negation contains an inherent absurdity. Positive law is a pattern of
conduct of a normative character; a normative form, or norm, means that among
various factual possibilities of conduct there are some that are chosen over the
others. Such possibilities of behavior are chosen over the others because they are
preferred, and this preference is founded upon a valuation. Although the norm
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of positive law emanates from the mandate of an existent power, it cannot be in
any manner understood as a mere fact; it is rather a human fact, and, as such,
has meaning or significance. This meaning basically consists in the reference to
a value. Or, to put it another way, the normativity of positive law would have
no meaning if it did not refer to a value judgment, which is what inspires it.
Social conduct is regulated in a certain way because it is believed that this is
better than other possible regulations. Of course it may be that sometimes
positive law fails in its intent, but, even when this happens, the intent to convert
values into reality is inherent in the law. It is matter then of a good intention
that has failed of its purpose, but as intention it exists essentially as a meaning
of the norm. By this it is demonstrated that if there did not exist something
above the bare reality of the positive norms, those same positive norms could
neither exist nor finally be understood. Thus, it may be affirmed categorically
that there are criteria of value capable of orienting-and consequently of judging
-positive law, because otherwise positive law could not exist. Now, since
positive law does exist, we must accept, therefore, the existence of criteria with
which to evaluate juristics. This argument in justification of juridical axiology
has the advantage over other arguments that it is neutral, namely, that it does
not imply the previous admission of other philosophical assumptions, and, consequently, it is fully valid against the positivist attitude. I do not reject other
reasons to justify juridical axiology, such as for example, the reference to God,
to a realm of values, etc. I think, however, that my argument, which leaves out
any reference to philosophic doctrine extrinsic to this matter, has a wider scope
than any other, and thus is better fitted to refute positivist or skeptical negation.
The second problem which follows is to determine whether the basis of
juridical axiology is empirical, or whether, on the contrary, it has necessarily to
be a priori. Radical empiricism applied to the problem of legal valuation is
tantamount to a skeptical negation. This radical empiricism has already been
refuted by the justification of juridical axiology and the need for it. There are,
however, other issues of juridical empiricism, which in spite of the desire to limit
knowledge to the sources of experience, have maintained the possibility of
establishing a system of values based upon experience (e.g., Herbert Spencer,
Adolf Merkel). These attempts result not only in an error but also in an
absurdity. The world of pure phenomena, without adding to it anything that is
not natural phenomena, can never furnish a criterion of preference or valuation;
for from the exclusive angle of the science of nature, what we call health is as
natural as what we call sickness, since both are facts which have their respective
causes. To distinguish between health and sickness, we must compare certain
data of experience with certain ideas of value and purpose. Empiricism cannot
provide any basis for valuation. It is important to notice that this conclusion
simply means that the root or primary foundation of all axiology is an a priori,
but does not in any way signify that value judgments as to law exclude other
ingredients of an empirical origin. It is obvious that to judge a historical law,
or to elaborate a juridical program, pure ideas of values are not sufficient. It is
necessary that these valuing criteria should be combined with the experience of
the realities to which the law or the legal program is related.
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. After it has been shown that the basis of juridical valuation is an a priori, we
have to ask what class of a priori it is: whether it is a subjective a priori or an
objective one. I reject axiological subjectivism (Meinong, Ehrenfels, Loening,
etc.) on the basis of the arguments given by Husserl against psychologism, and
also on the basis of some of the reasons developed by Max Scheler and Nicola
Hartmann for justifying the objectivity of values. Though I reject psychologistic
subjectivism, I do not, however, go so far as the thesis of abstract objectivity, but
hold that the objectivity of values, which are mere projections of mental mechanisms or reactions, is immanent in human life. Values are objectively valid
meanings, but they are meaningful to us only within the realm of human life.
Values are not created by man; rather, man has to recognize values. Moreover,
the significance of values is related to human existence. It could be said that
God thinks of those values as being objectively valid, but man only within the
realm of human life and not as abstract entities unrelated to human creatures.
In addition, it is necessary to go further: values, which are objective, yet only
meaningful within human life-within the context of human existence-are
furthermore related to the context of concrete situations.
. The last statement helps us to approach and solve the problem of the historicity of juridical ideals. This is the most crucial problem with which legal
philosophy has been dealing throughout its development for twenty-four centuries.
On the one hand, we find values, which are objective, a priori ideas. On the
other hand, we find history, with a great variety of regimes and institutions,
distributed in space and time. This variety and this change are not only a
testimony of many different facts, but they also bring with them normative
demands for diversification in every given situation and at every concrete stage.
Is there any method for harmoniously reconciling what a priori criteria demand
with what the concrete circumstances of every time and place require? This is
the question concerning not merely the historicity of law, which is a factual
datum, but also historicity of juridical ideals, a problem of legal philosophy, of
juridical axiology. As to this problem, I have learned much from the Thomist
doctrine, re-elaborated by Suirez. I think, however, that nowadays it is possible
to obtain a more accurate insight into this question, thanks to several new developments in twentieth century philosophy, e.g., metaphysics of human life,
ontological analysis of man's historical condition, and phenomenological exploration of the plurality of values, vocational and situational. At first sight, it may
seem that it is a question of harmoniously uniting two elements of a very different
character: a priori ideas of necessary validity, with empirical facts, with diverse,
unstable, contingent circumstances. The problem, however, does not consist of
this, but of something else: the problem is to unite the materialization of the
normative consequences of values with the concrete characteristics of each
historical situation where those consequences must be realized. It is a problem
of realization, of materialization. Now, since values are realized in human life,
and since human life is essentially historical, the realization of values must also
be historical. This writer has outlined five justified sources of historicity for
ideal programs of law. Four of these sources are derived from the conditions
of realization, and the fifth is based on a diversity of concrete values.
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The first source of historicity for juridical ideals is the fact that social reality
is diverse and changing. The matter in which, with which, and for which, the
requirements of the juridical values must be realized is different in every case.
The diversity and the change of social matter affect the realization of juridical
values, and will account for different norms according to each situation. At
first sight this consideration seems to coincide with some thought of Scholasticism
(St. Thomas and Su~rez), or with Stammler's doctrine as well. There certainly
is a similarity between these two theories and mine. I am concerned, however,
with the problem of fulfilling value requirements in human life, and, in addition,
I stress the fact that those values are not all necessarily formal; many of them
actually have a concrete content.
The second source of historicity for juridical ideals consists in the diversity
obstacles
which in each situation must be overcome in order to materialize the
of
requirements of value in such situation-obstacles which frequently explain and
justify the means chosen, that is, the various institutions which are shaped.
The third source of historicity consists in the lessons drawn from practical
experience, from trial and error, as to the adequacy of the means to materialize
a value in a concrete situation.
The fourth source consists in the priorities raised by the gradations of urgency
of the social needs which each historical situation brings up. Men cannot realize
everything at one and the same time.
The fifth source of historicity does not derive from problems of realization or
efficacy, but has its origin in the multiplicity of values which may be relevant to
the law. Values, although they have an objective worth, contain in themselves
the references to the concrete situations to which they are intrinsically related,
and for which they give rise to specific norms. There certainly are ethical and
juridical values which refer to the universal human, and, therefore, engender
ideal norms of general application for all men and for all societies. There are,
however, other values which also have objective worth and contain in their very
core particular reference to the situation of a person, a nation, or a historical
condition. There is a common, generic moral that includes all men and constitutes the indispensable minimum for all. Yet, in addition, there is a series of
vocational and situational morals-for each person, for each condition-which
does not contradict or lessen the general moral, but which complements it. The
same applies to the juridical field: corresponding to the multiplicity of the
national and supranational types, and to the variety of historical conditions, there
is a multiplicity of particular programs. There are, of course, general juridical
values which give rise to universal ideal norms, valid for all collectivities, for all
times, and for all situations. Nevertheless, in addition there are particular values,
corresponding to the multiplicity of historical conditions, of the national and
supranational types, which engender particular norms for each community and
each situation.
This writer has drawn attention to the fact that in analyzing the problem of
justice we are confronted by a baffling paradox. On the one hand, a review of
all doctrines on justice proves that there is a basic identity throughout all the
schools: the idea of justice as a pattern of harmony, of proportional equality, as
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a harmonious means of exchange and distribution in human interrelations, either
between individuals, or between the individuals and the community; or, in other
terms, to give each one his own or what is due to him. On the other hand, it is
a well-known fact that controversies on the problems of justice have been, and
still are, most ardent. It so happens, however, that the task of establishing
equality between what one gives and what one receives, and of attaining proportionality in the division of benefits, functions, and public offices, as well as of
public duties or burdens, presupposes criteria for the measurement or appraisal of
the realities which must be equalized or harmonized. The mere idea of equality,
proportionality, or harmony does not provide us with any criterion of measurement, does not give us the practical principle by which to determine this proportional or harmonious equality. It does not show us what is the viewpoint from
which equalization should be considered. It is not sufficient to say equality or
proportion. Equality in what? Equality from what standpoint? And how? What
are the relevant facts to be taken as the basis for proportion or harmony? Nor
is it sufficient to say that each one must be given "his own," "his due," because
this principle does not define what ought to be considered as particularly one's
own, or one's due. Agreement exists that equal things or situations should be
treated in an equal way, and unequal things or situations should be treated
differently, according to their diversities. Agreement also exists that persons who
are equals should be treated in an equal manner, and those who are unequal
should be treated differently, according to their diverse merits. But at one and
the same time disagreement exists as to the viewpoints for appraising both
equalities and inequalities. This is the problem: to investigate the values relevant
to harmonization or proportional equalization, or to clarify what is due to
each one.
Consequently, the very core of the problem of justice consists in determining
the values which must be taken into account by the state and the law. It consists,
moreover, in determining the means of judgment which justice assumes or implies.
It consists, finally, in ascertaining the rules of hierarchy among such values, i.e.,
investigating what values have priority over others, as well as formulating the
mutual interrelationships among these values. It is according to the values
relevant to the political organization and to the law, and according to the hierarchical relations among these values, that harmony-equivalence and proportionality-must be established in interindividual relations, as well as between the
individual and the state.
First of all, attention must be given to the values by which, always and
necessarily, the law must be inspired, such as dignity and liberty of the individual,
values which give rise to ideal norms of a general scope, applicable to everyone,
and to every case and situation.
In the second place, we should state which values, although very high in the
axiological hierarchy, must not be related to the law or to the political organization-such as values connected with sanctity, religious faith, and moral puritybecause these values can be realized only by the individual's free and voluntary
decision, and never by compulsion.
In the third place, we must investigate what other values, in which cases, and
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under what conditions, might be, or should be, taken into account in the shaping
of the law. For example, on some occasions the law will have to draw inspiration
from viewpoints founded upon scientific values, when attempting to set up a
department of health or to draw up a health statute.
Still, the principal problem consists in clarifying the relationships of hierarchy
among the values relevant to the making of just law.
The principal problem involved in this theme is to know what is the human
person's value in relation to the other values which can be taken into consideration by the law. The question is whether the individual human person must be
taken as a mere means to the service of the state (transpersonalism), or whether,
on the contrary, the state and the law, like all other cultural products, must be
appraised only as means to the service of the individual (humanism or personalism). This means finding the respective rank or hierarchy among the various
values in relation to the various substrata in which each kind of value materializes: whether the highest values are those which are shaped in social and political
institutions or other cultural products, or whether, on the contrary, the highest
values are those which can be embodied only in the spiritual person by his free
conduct, having priority over all the other values which materialize in social and
political organizations and in culture.
I have provided reasons, strictly philosophical, to prove that humanism or
personalism is the only correct doctrine. It should be noticed that no doubt is
cast upon the fact that the state, like all other social institutions, must embody
in itself very important values. This is taken for granted. The question here
formulated is concerned with something else: whether values which materialize
in the state are its own, exclusively pertaining to the political organization, or,
on the contrary, are only relative values, which function as conditions, as means
for the individuals, in order that human beings may comply with the values which
must be fulfilled in their own personal conscience.
The philosophical reasons which I give to justify humanism or personalism
are the following:
1) Although idealism has been superseded, one of its views survives as a
firm truth, namely, the basic fact that my individual consciousness constitutes the
center, support, and proof of all other realities. I am not simply a thing among
other things, for at least I am the witness of all the other realities in the universe.
Actually the components of my world are objectively real. Nevertheless, the
individual consciousness acts as a selective sieve, and as an organizing perspective,
of the ingredients of my world. Out of the infinity of components which make
up reality, the person takes a certain number, whose form and content fit the
structure of his mind and the texture of his interests and preferences, and with
these ingredients he builds up his world. The perspective created by man is
inescapable and necessary. The world necessarily appears as a correlative of the
self, as my world.

2) Human life-which consists of the copresence of the subject with his
objects, of the self with his world, of my world with me, as inseparable, correlative
elements in a reciprocal relation of dependence-is the first base or point of
departure of philosophy. Moreover, it is also the fundamental reality, that is, the
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reality within the frame of which occur all other realities, the reality to which
all the other realities are related. Therefore, human life, or existence, must be
given priority in a view of the universe, since, whether we like it or not, human
existence is necessarily its foundation and center. Consequently, the realization
of values is meaningful within and for human life.
3) It should be remembered that the authentic or genuine human life is
always an individual's life. In fact, society is not an entity in and for itself, with
an existence apart from that of the individual men who form it. Society is not a
subsistent reality. The only substantive realities are the men who compose society.
4) Culture, as the outcome of a longing for, or purpose to, the fulfillment
of values-goodness, justice, truth, beauty, utility, power, wealth, etc.-has meaning only for man, who does not possess these values in full measure, and who,
nevertheless, feels the need of exerting himself to their conquest. Therefore,
culture cannot be meaningfully predicated of unconscious nature or of God, who
is by essence absolute Wisdom and Truth, Total Good, Supreme Justice, Infinite
Power; nor has it meaning for animals, which, though they lack intellectual
knowledge, moral virtue, artistic vocation, are not aware of these deficiencies,
and do not feel any need of, or yearning for, such values. Thus, culture appears
as having full meaning only for man, as a human function.
5) In the axiological hierarchy, those values that are to be fulfilled within
the individual conscience, namely, moral values, and those that lift the individual
spirit, have a rank higher than values that are to be materialized in things such
as works of art, tools, etc., higher also than values to be embodied in social
institutions, including nation, state, and law. Objectivated culture-art, science,
technology, economy, law, government, etc.-has meaning and justification solely as
a means to man's service, instrumental for man's spiritual improvement. Culture's
functions must consist in uplifting the mind, refining the sentiments, and improving the conduct. Furthermore, the individual person is a free being. Society
and the state must recognize the individual's moral autonomy and never treat
him merely as a part of the social whole. A member of society, the individual is
at the same time superior to society, because he is a person, which society can
never be.
Recognition of this point is not tantamount at all to an attitude of individual
selfishness or any lack of social responsibility. This principle-of the higher rank
of individual values-does not preclude the maxim which gives priority to the
common good over the individual interests. On the contrary, the above principle must be complemented with the maxim which rules that pxivate interest
must surrender to the common good. Between these two principles there is no
incompatibility, because the common good must be understood principally as the
satisfaction of the greatest proportion of interests of all persons as far as it is
possible, with the least sacrifice, the least friction and the least waste-to use
the words of Roscoe Pound. In addition, common good also includes those
general conditions which facilitate the best satisfaction of those interests. Still,
it is true that among all human interests, the first rank must be given to those
interests which seek to bring about the realization of values that can be embodied
only in the individual by his free decision.
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I recently published a book, A New Philosophy of Legal Interpretation, in
which I emphasize four points: (1) Positive law does not consist of logical truths,
to be treated by purely logical methods of drawing consequences from the rules
by syllogistic deduction, but rather of human purposes historically conditioned.
A legal rule is a means chosen to bring about certain effects in a social situation,
precisely those effects which are considered as just and adequate in a certain time
and place. (2) The legal order does not consist solely of general rules, but also
of individualized norms-judicial decisions and administrative resolutions. Decisions are the only juridical norms that are perfect, for they are the only norms
which can be compulsorily enforced. (3) The judicial function, as well as
administrative action, is always creative. These do not consist in mere application
or development of the content of the general rule, but add determinations which
are not included in the general rule. (4) In the light of the three foregoing
considerations, it becomes clear that traditional logic (of such as Aristotle, Bacon,
and John Stuart Mill), which is the pure logic of the rational (mathematics), has
little application to judicial decisions or to lawmaking. There is, however,
another province of logic, different from the pure logic of the rational, namely,
the logic of the reasonable, which is concerned with human action. This new
material logic of the reasonable, which I have begun to explore, has, among
others, the following characteristics: (a) It is conditioned by the concrete social
reality in which it operates. (b) It is a process which includes extensive use of
concrete value judgments. (c) It is determined by reasons of adequacy, between
social reality and values; between values and ends (valuable ends) ; between ends
and concrete conditions (ends susceptible of being carried out); between ends
and means as to the fitness of the means; between ends and means as to the
ethical rightness of the latter; and between ends and means as to the efficacy of
the means. In addition, the logic of the reasonable is oriented also by the lessons
drawn from vital and historical experience, individual and social, from trial and
error.

THE PERSPECTIVISM AND DOCTRINE OF VALUE OF GARciA MAYNEZ

Eduardo Garcia Miynez, 92 a professor of jurisprudence at the National
University of Mexico, one of the outstanding legal thinkers in Ibero-America, has
made many contributions to the general theory of law, among them a particularly
clear definition of liberty as a legal right: that is, legal liberty consists in a person's
right, subject to legal order, to exercise or not to exercise certain of his rights. In
addition, Garcia MAynez is one of the most successful pioneers in exploring the
new domain of formal logic and ontology of juristics, so much so that his work

in this field has become world famous and is considered as a model. He is also
92.

GARCiA MAYNEZ, INTRODUCCI6N AL ESTUDIO DEL DERECHO (6th ed., Mexico, 1956);
LA DEFINICI6N DEL DERECHO: ENSAYO DE PERSPECTIVISMO JURfDICO (Mexico, 1951);
Los PRINCIPIOS DE LA ONTOLOGfA FORMAL DEL DERECHO Y SU EXPREsI6N SIMB6LICA
(Mexico, 1953); L6cICA DEL JuxcIo JURfDICO (Mexico, 1955).

LUIS RECAStNS-SICHES
Director of the Institute of Philosophy of the same university and has done considerable work in the realm of general philosophy, especially in ethics. In the
field of values he has done some research, chiefly inspired by the school of
Scheler and Hartmann, in which he has developed a juridical axiology. Moreover, Garcia Mtynez has contributed a new approach to the problem of the
definition of law. If we look at all the definitions which have been given to law,
we shall realize that those definitions do not refer to one and the same object,
but must be classified in three groups, because among those definitions reference
is made to three different objects, namely: formally valid law, the law which is
valid within a positive legal order and according to that same order; natural law,
i.e., just law, intrinsically or inherently valid law, law which realizes value
requirements; and efficacious law, law which is effectively observed and complied
with, real law from a sociological viewpoint.
Then Garcia M6ynez analyzes the various types of legal rules which may
exist by taking into account these three different approaches and combining them.
The three definitions of the law concur in those rules which are formally valid,
ethically justified, and, in addition, really efficacious. There are, however, six
other types of rules, in each of which one or two of those characteristics are
lacking. It must be noted that natural law is by itself neither formally valid law
(state law) nor effective law (norms actually fulfilled). However, Garcia M6ynez
proposes a theory, which, beyond classic natural law theory and beyond positivism
-both formalistic (Kelsen) and sociological-may bridge the three different
meanings of the word "law," or, to be more accurate, the three different objects
meant by this word. There is a dialectical relation between the idea of a just
order (complying with the requirements of natural law) and the idea of a social
organization, which alone is authorized to formulate and apply the rules of law.
The making of positive law is axiologically determined by ideal principles. Law
in force in modem civilized nations is to a large extent "jusnaturalistic gold, which
the state has coined as legal tender." Moreover, it should be noted that there is
no incompatibility among the three definitions of law, because it is possible that
one and the same rule be formally valid, just, and effective. As a matter of fact,
this case is the "desideratum." What sometimes prevents the concurrence of these
three attributes (formal validity, justice, and efficacy) is the fact of the limitations
of the evaluating conscience. The aim to realize values in a certain given
historical situation leads to the setting up of a political organization of society.
It so happens, however, that when such an organization has been established, it
claims a monopoly in the making and application of the law. This condition is
responsible for the fact that the criterion of formal validity is substituted for the
criterion of material justice. This divergency is resolved when the three criteria
happen to concur in one and the same legal rule. The efficacy of the juridical
ideal in a certain historical situation may be considered also as the fulfillment of
a teleological relationship, in which the "purpose" is constituted by this ideal, in
which the "means" is constituted by the legal organization of society, and in which
the realization of the purpose is identical with the legal system in force.
Garcia M~ynez applies the axiological objectivism of Scheler and Hartmann
to juridical values. Values are a priori and objective ideas. In addition, values
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are principles which imply the condition of possibility for ethical phenomena.
Man's ethos is neither a conceptual structure nor an "essence." Therefore, values
must transcend the borders of their conceptual being, in order to be introduced
into the real field of human activity. For this reason, values, which basically are
ideas, act, in addition, as principles within the real conscience that evaluates.
Thus, values may become determining factors in judgments of approval or disapproval, as well as in judgments of attribution and responsibility. Values, however, lack the power to act by themselves, to introduce themselves into the actual
realm of conduct. They need a factual agency, which, recognizing their ideal
requirements, converts them into action.
The fact that juridical values are objectively valid does not preclude the condition that juridical values possess various forms of relativity. It must be noted
that relativity does not mean relativism. The latter implies that values depend
on the changing opinion of men, whereas the former, relativity, merely means
that the value content is referred to certain real conditions which are variable.
According to Garcia Miynez, the various relativity forms of juridical values may
be classified into three groups: (1) Relativity to persons. First of all, juridical
values are relative to man. Second, they are relative to men, bilaterally connected.

(2) Relativity to concrete situations. This relativity arises from, and is

conditioned by, certain specific facts which determine the obligation for realizing
certain juridical values. Natural law is varied and changing, not because values
change, but because the matter in which values must be embodied is variable.
(3) Relativity to space and time.

Whereas values in themselves are not in space

and not in time, the normative requirements flowing from them are conditioned
by both space and time.
Garcia M6.ynez considers juridical security as a functional value, i.e., as
instrumental, as belonging to the category of means. The substantive value is
justice. As to the problem of whether individual or collective values must have
the primacy, Garcia Miynez rejects both collectivism and individualism, because
each one is purely unilateral. On the one hand, the community, which is only
an abstraction, must recognize that the individual, as a person, is superior to
society; and furthermore the community must realize that it can assert itself only
through the individuals. Yet we must understand that the individual can realize
himself only within society, using the cultural legacy and benefiting from his
fellow men's help. The antagonism between individual and collective values can
be solved only by finding a formula for harmonizing the conflicting values. We
must understand that above the selfish individual values and the collective values
there is another set of values-the values of man's moral personality. The
principle of "neither the individual nor the community, but society based upon
justice" has the following consequences: (1) A legal rule which encroaches upon
the rights which man has as a moral person may never be justified. (2) All men
are equal as to the inherent dignity of the human person; moreover, fundamental
rights are equal for all men. (3) Personality, on the other hand, is a legitimate
source of inequality, as each person has different abilities. Consequently, each
person must undertake the functions and responsibilities for which he is especially
qualified, and each person must be given according to his own merits. Justice
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requires equal protection of fundamental rights for everyone, and further requires
a harmonious structure among the different capabilities and responsibilities of
individuals, who, being equal as to personal dignity, are, however, unequal as
to their abilities.
THE

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROLEGOMENA
OF JUAN LLAMBiAS DE AZEVEDO

Juan Llambias de Azevedo, 93 a professor of jurisprudence at the University
of Montevideo, Uruguay, is one of the leading philosophers in the Spanishspeaking world. His contribution, though deeply influenced by Husserl's phenomenology as well as by the school of Scheler and Hartmann, is strongly original.
In his principal systematic work, up to now-an introduction to philosophy of
law-he deals with the following five problems: (1) The essence of positive law,
which, as a collective object, is defined as a bilateral and retributive system of
rules proposed by man to regulate the social conduct of a group of men as a
means for realizing the values of the community. (2) The essence of the single
legal rules, being such rules classified into two groups: rules which establish
an obligation and rules which establish a power. The author clarifies a series of
axioms concerning the relationships between these two kinds of rules. (3) The
real and actual existence of law, which consists in its "validity," i.e., in the

condition of "being in force." Validity is the form in which law exists. The
author distinguishes between positivity and validity. Positivity means an essential
note of the law: to have been "posited," made by man. Validity is something
more than positivity. It is not identical with efficacy, although law cannot be
valid without a minimum of efficacy. Validity is normativity "in force."
(4) Ontology of the law, the place of the law in the general sphere of objects.
The author classifies the objects of the universe from the viewpoint of temporal
existence. There are nontemporal, immutable objects, which are what they are,
and how they are, permanently, e.g., essences, numbers, geometrical figures. On
the other hand, some objects begin and end; they have a development in a nonreversible direction; they stand in time. Temporal or real objects are subclassified
into the following categories: (a) temporal objects in space (corporeal); (b)
temporal objects without space, psychological

(perceiving, thinking, valuing,

etc.); and (c) spiritual objects, or contents-thoughts, judgments, all the contents
of art, science, ethics, etc.-as distinguished from the psychological acts in which
they are given, manifesting themselves in objectively outlined forms. Law is a
temporal object, noncorporeal, nonpsychological, spiritual. (5) Juridical axiology,
belonging to the field which Llambias de Azevedo calls "aporetics of the law"the field of the philosophical problems raised by positive laws.
In his introduction to juridical axiology, Llambias de Azevedo considers two
basic problems: (1) What is the content of the law in relation to the content of
93.
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values? (2) What should be the content of the law in relation to the content
of values? Positive law is a mediation between the values of the community and
human conduct. To some extent values are realized in the juridical norms. But
man, in making law, must be guided by those same values. Then, we meet the
problem of whether the making of positive law is justified or not. It is justified,
because the normative essence of the law implies that man does not always realize
spontaneously or docilely. This is true not only in respect to the regulated men;
the same deviation may affect the regulator. The problem, then, is: who ought
to be those who dictate the law, in order that the law dictated should be adequate
for the values of the community? In what conditions must the lawmakers be
placed, what qualities must they have, in order to prevent deviation from their
true end, in order that the law may be just? Thus, what is sought is the political
equivalent of the values of the community, especially the political equivalent of
justice: the question of the ideal community, and of its form of government.
Llambias de Azevedo thinks that values are objective essences, having an internal,
axiological order, a hierarchic structure. Juridical values are inferior to religious,
moral, and logical values; but they are superior to the values of biological life
and to economic and technological values.
Cossio's

EGOLOGICAL

SCHOOL:

ITS FOLLOWERS

AND ITS CRITICS

The Argentine professor, Carlos Cossio,94 is responsible for a new legal

philosophy that he calls the "egological theory of law," which has gained several
adherents in his country, as well as in other South-American countries. The
point of departure of Cossio's first thinking was Neo-Kantian legal philosophy
(Stammler and Kelsen). Later on, he received the influence of phenomenology,
Heidegger's existentialism, and various other trends. Cossio's theory is an attempt
to go beyond Kelsen without abandoning him. Philosophy of law has the following tasks: juridical ontology; formal juridical logic; and transcendental juridical
logic. Law is a cultural object, and, therefore, unlike conceptual and real objects,
it is not neutral in respect to values. Cultural objects must be grasped by an
empirical dialectic method, the method of comprehension. Cultural objects are
classified into two categories: (1) Objects of the world (objectivated products of
man's activity) ; and (2) Egological objects, i.e., human action, in which human
conduct, as such, is articulated. Law is an "egological object," is living human
life, is conduct; it is human conduct in its intersubjective interference: as obligation, as legal right, as violation, or as application of a sanction (implementation,
94. CossIO, EL PROBLEMA DE LA COERCI6N JURIDICA Y SU
Aires, 1937); LA PLENITUD DEL ORDENAMIENTO JURfDICO, Y LA
DE LA LEY (Buenos Aires, 1939); EL SUBSTRATO FILOs6FICO
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or penalty). The science of law is the science of juridical experience. Since
human conduct cannot be neutral to values, legal science must concern itself with
juridical evaluation. Cossio does not, however, think that law is a mediation
between values and human conduct. On the contrary, he thinks that values are
immanent in the law; valuation is a component of the law, in addition to the
logical-formal components and to the contingent-material ingredients of the law.
Legal values are positive values, values inherent in the concrete positive law;
they are data given to the jurist in the positive law. Nevertheless, Cossio admits
there is the possibility of bringing up another different problem of value at a
higher level, at a level above the positive values materialized in a concrete positive
law, namely, the problem of a pure juridical axiology, which consists in inquiring
whether the actual ideals of a positive legal system do correspond to the "true
ideals," or do not. This problem, however, does not primarily interest the jurist
as such; it is a problem of metaphysics concerning the theme of an objective realm
of values. Anyway, there exists an undeniable fact: sometimes man rebels against
the law in force, for the sake of justice. Cossio has recently published a series of
studies which contain further analyses of values.
Cossio's ideas have exercised a strong and widespread influence throughout
Ibero-America, and especially in his country. Among the numerous scholars
deeply influenced by the philosophy of Cossio, the following must be mentioned:
Enrique R. Aftali6n, 9 5 who first followed some trends of Del Vecchio and Stammler, and in addition has contributed some original ideas; Carlos Garcia Olano and
Jos6 M. Vilanova, co-authors with Aftali6n of an excellent book on jurisprudence; 9 6 Ernesto E. Borga, 9 7 who has written two works of high quality;
Federico Llovet;9 s Julio Cueto Rfia, 9 9 a brilliant visiting professor at Southern
Methodist University, Dallas, Texas; Mario Alberto Copello;100 J. Francisco
Linares; 10 1 and Juan Ramirez Gronda. 102 In addition, mention should be made
of two of Cossio's disciples who have applied the "egological theory of law" to
particular problems of law: Laureano Landaburu, 10 3 who produced an interesting
study on crime as "structure" (in the sense of Dilthey) ; and Lorenzo Cornelli,
author of an important book, Time and Law.
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Ambrosio Gioja,10 4 a professor of philosophy of law at the University of
Buenos Aires, was earlier a direct and close collaborator of Cossio. In the last
few years, however, he has thoroughly accomplished a critical analysis of Cossio's
"egological theory" and has considerably deviated from it. His doctoral thesis is
an interesting investigation of the metaphysical foundation of the law in Kant.
Another study deals with the "architectonic" aspects of Kelsen's pure theory of
law. In further writings, as well as in his teaching, he has made outstanding
contributions to the foundations of legal science and to the phenomenological
analysis of both the legal rule and the legal order, taking as a foundation certain
ideas of Husserl. Gioja has also devoted some attention to values, following a
humanistic trend.
Genaro R. Carri6 and Reno Entelmann were followers of Cassio's school, but
later they evolved toward a critical attitude to "egologism," and have made some
new contributions oriented toward the new developments of Gioja. Manuel
Herrera Figueroal05 in his early publications was much influenced by Cossio,
but later he turned to classic sources in his studies on values and justice.
Rafael Pizzani, 10 6 formerly president of the University of Caracas, though to
some extent influenced by Cossio, formulated serious objections to the "egological
theory." He has made some other contributions to several themes of jurisprudence.
7
Among the objectors to Cossio's interpretation of Kelsen, Jaime Perriauxl0
is one of the most effective.
OTHER SOUTH-AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS
TO JURIDICAL AXIOLOGY

Francisco Romero 10s (universities of Buenos Aires and La Plata), undoubtedly
the highest ranking philosopher in South America, is not a jurist himself. However, his outstanding works, especially those concerned with values and philosophical anthropology, furnish some sound foundations for juridical axiology.
In addition, he has in his studies dealt with several basic problems of society,
politics, and law, in a most inspiring manner.
Risieri Frondizi, 10 9 a professor at the same universities, has presented new
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axiological perspectives which I deem to be an important advancement in the
philosophy of values.
Sebastian Soler,"0 prominent Argentine scholar, is famous for both his studies
in the field of penal law and his outstanding contributions to legal philosophy.
The latter comprise, among others, essays dealing with the faith in the law, the
individualized norm, the present crisis in relation to law and politics, and the
juridical values. As to juridical values; Soler, going beyond both objectivism and
psychological subjectivism, recalls the reservations made by Aristotle when he
differentiated between theoretical and practical rationality; and, along this line,
he distinguishes between moral values and social evaluations in force. Juridical
values belong to the latter category. Legal valuations are felt as social, crystallizations, above the individual, embodied in principles and rules which are
objectively materialized. Recognition of the law as a system of objective rules
involves the very destiny of man, for man can develop himself satisfactorily only
within the frame of a legal system which protects his basic freedom, in a manner
both certain and secure. Soler stands for the values of man's fundamental rights
and freedoms, as well as for democracy. He thinks of these ideals as of a rather
dynamic task of progressive realization and readaptation. Legal security provides
man with a wide area in which he may become more and more free. Man's
right to freedom is based upon his inherent dignity, and upon the very structure
of his life. Freedom will thrive as far as it is freedom under the laws, so that
there be no space for arbitrariness.
Juan Jos6 Bruera, 1 1 1 a distinguished professor at the School of Philosophy of
the University of Rosario, Argentina, has written excellent studies on jurisprudence. He has analyzed the historical, political, and axiological roots of the legal
rule. In his contribution to juridical axiology, Bruera has gone beyond the
relativist attitude and tends toward a transcendental spirituality. He has also
contributed an outstanding book on causality from the viewpoint of legal philosophy, in which he emphasizes the far-reaching scope which freedom has for
the law.
Angela Romera, a woman who is a brilliant professor at the University of
Santa Fe, Argentina, has written many critical comments on themes of legal philosophy which are really inspiring.
Martin T. Ruiz Moreno, '112 a professor of jurisprudence at the University of
Buenos Aires, is the author of important works in the field of philosophy of law.
Among his various studies there are some fine analyses of the different types of
foundations for political and legal axiology.
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Jorge Millas,l13 general philosopher and also legal thinker, a professor at the
University of Chile (Santiago), has made some important contributions to
juridical doctrine. In one of his studies, he has shown that beyond pure legal
duty, which is established by positive law and its concomitant sanction, a philosophical question arises about the primary foundation for the obligatoriness of
the law as a whole, for the obligation to obey the rules of the system of positive
law. This primary foundation must be an axiological judgment. The "basic
norm" (in Kelsen's terms) must be supported by an axiological imperative.
Luis Eduardo Nieto Arteta,11 4 Colombian scholar who died a few years ago,
wrote many important studies on legal philosophy. He was mainly influenced by
Kelsen, Husserl, and Cossio, but contributed original ideas, especially in the
field of logic and ontology of the law.
Genaro Salinas Quiroga,11 5 a professor at the University of Nuevo Le6n
(Monterrey, Mexico), has written a book in which, under the influence of certain
ideas of this writer, he makes new contributions to legal philosophy.
Antonio Machado Netoll 6 (University of Bahia, Brazil), who has also been
influenced by Jos6 Ortega y Gasset, has made important contributions to legal
philosophy. In addition, he has developed a sociology of natural law wherein he
clarifies the influence that various historic situations have exercised on the different
doctrines of natural law. He analyzes the situation in which natural law acted
as an ideology to preserve actual conditions, and the other situations in which
natural law rather assumed the role of a utopia with a revolutionary purpose.
This sociological study of the real frames of natural law does not prevent Machado Neto from upholding, at a philosophical level, the legitimacy of juridical
axiology along the lines that I have developed.
Mention should also be made of the contributions of the following professors:
Rodrigo Facio (San Jos6, Costa Rica); Santiago I. Rompani (Montevideo,
Uruguay); Anibal Bascufiin11 7 and Benjamin Cid, both of Santiago de Chile;
Rolando Merino Reyes (Concepci6n, Chile); Rafael Garcia Rosquellas (Sucre,
Bolivia), who develops an interpretation of the actual evaluations in which
positive law is inspired; and Vicente Ter~n (Potosi, Bolivia), whose thinking
develops along contemporary lines.' 1 8
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JURIDICAL AXIOLOGY ON THE BASIS

OF A PHILOSOPHY

OF CULTURE, MORE OR LESS RELATIVIST.

Juan Manuel Terin Mata, 11 9 a professor at the National University of
Mexico, began his philosophical thinking on the law under a strong influence
of Neo-Kantianism (especially of the school of Windelband and Rickert). Later
on, however, his thinking has included, to some extent, certain aspects of the
sociology of knowledge, along the line of Mannheim, though still keeping some
basic Neo-Kantian premises. Legal philosophy, in his view, purports to present
a universal and rational view of the law, and it deals with three problems:
(1) Logic and ontology of the law: concept of law, which includes also determination of the reality of the law, because a reality is exhausted in its concept.
(2) juridical axiology. (3) Realization of the law, i.e., how human law orients
itself toward the compliance with its ends and values (fundamentals of legal
technique). Ter6.n Mata regards the law as having a cultural content with
coercive normativity.
Juridical axiology--which is a part of ethics, and provides the criteria for
politics-tries to ascertain what is good for a certain social group. On the one
hand, Ter6m Mata rejects any attempt to find an absolute and permanent natural
law, because such a scheme would preclude historical evolution. On the other
hand, he also rejects axiological subjectivism, because it is absurd: justice,
common good, order, security in social relations cannot be explained or established
from a subjective viewpoint. Values, including the legal ones, are objective. But
he does not think that values are certain qualities which per se may reside in
things. On the contrary, he thinks that values are teleological or finalistic relationships. For example, a certain action is just, not considering it isolated, but as far
as it is referred to another action or situation. Values are relative modes of
reference. Outside a finalist function there is no value. Every value is a form of
functional relationship. Philosophy of law seeks the last fundamentals for legal
evaluation, which consist of the rational and unifying determination of the
variable historic positions. Tern Mata thinks there is something correct in the
endeavor to find a natural law, namely, the search for certain permanent bases
which enable us to comprehend the historic variations in a unitarian form. This
endeavor toward universality is right. However, such universal principles,
rational and abstract, do not provide us with adequate criteria for solving
particular cases. They could perhaps furnish only the inspiration for making
general rules of positive law. Finally, Terin Mata, strongly influenced by
Mannheim's theory on ideologies, thinks that it is not possible to establish a
system of absolute values and principles for social life. At the bottom of every
theory there exists a historic play of interests and wants. It is true that men,
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when thinking of justice, have always endeavored to attain an equilibrium among
the interests playing in social coexistence. It so happens, however, that the idea
of justice, as an ideology, has always accepted different value contents.
Jos6 Delgado Ocando,1 2 0 a young professor of jurisprudence at the University
of Zulia, Maracaibo, Venezuela, has written an excellent book on the philosophy
of law. The elucidation of juridical values implies a comparison between the
evaluation chosen by the lawmaker and our own valuation, the latter being not
a positive valuation but an ideal one, i.e., a metaempirical pattern. On the one
hand, Delgado Ocando, in agreement with Cossio, thinks that positive valuations
are an intrinsic component of man made law. On the other hand, Delgado
Ocando, though admitting a critical re-evaluation from a philosophical viewpoint,
professes a sort of cultural relativism, which, he says, is not tantamount to skepticism. Values are corelative to realities. The critical analysis of the positive norms
seeks to clarify the authentic social reality. 'Such a clarification will show the
genuinely human and set aside the fictitious appearances of ideologies and symbols.
Jurisprudence on the basis of a philosophy of culture, more or less relativist,
is brilliantly flourishing in Brazil nowadays, especially under the influence of
Miguel Reale, one of the leading thinkers in Latin America at the present. Before
giving a summary of his outstanding work, the author of this article considers it
suitable to make a brief reference to some earlier developments in Brazilian
philosophy of law.
Philosophy of law in Brazil has a long and brilliant tradition. Among the
thinkers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, special mention must be
made of five figures: Tobias Barreto, Sylvio Romero, Farias Brito, Clovis Bevilaqua, and Francisco Pontes de Miranda. The influence of Comtean positivism
in Brazil was very strong in the nineteenth century, in both academic and
political life. Nevertheless, these five legal thinkers went much beyond the limits
of positivism, and, under the influence of other currents, especially German,
built up original philosophies of law.

Tobias Barreto

21

(1839-1889)

takes

certain Kantian premises as an epistemological point of departure, and also as
ethical foundation. He develops his legal doctrine, however, on the basis of a
philosophy of culture along evolutionist trends. Whereas he rejects rigid natural
law, he stands for the idea of a natural pattern for the law, conditioned by culture.
Sylvio Romero,12 2 (b. 1851), to a certain -extent antipositivist, was, nevertheless,
deeply influenced by Kant and by Spencer, and was an enthusiastic follower of
Jhering. Spencer's evolutionism is for him only a rejuvenated Neo-Kantianism.
With Kant, he admits free will; and, with Spencer, sociological conditioning.
Farias Britot23 (1862-1917), an original adherent of evolutionism, became later
a representative of religious faith and mysticism. His last philosophy is influenced
both by Thomism and by Leibnitz. Clovis Bevilaqua 12 4 (1859-1944), who is
considered one of the greatest jurists in the Western Hemisphere, also wrote on
120.
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the philosophy of law. Though for a long time he was sympathetic to evolutionism, he became strongly influenced by Jhering, and finally leaned toward
125
Stammler's "natural law with variable content." Francisco Pontes de Miranda
(b. 1892) has kept closer to sociological positivism, though influenced by some
of Nietzsche's leitmotifs. In addition to these five legal philosophers, another
should be recalled: Pedro Lessa, 12 6 whose work is close to empirical sociologism.
Miguel Reale,12 7 a professor at the University of Sio Paulo, doubtless one of
the most prominent legal thinkers of Latin America, is responsible for what he
calls "the tri-dimensional theory of law." Law is a historico-cultural reality, which
essentially possesses three dimensions, each one of which is a necessary element of
juridical experience: fact, value, and norm. Law is a spiritual fact, in which,
and by which, values are historically embodied in the form of a normative
structure that establishes an order among intersubjective relations between individuals, as well as between the individual and the community. These three
dimensions are reciprocally bound together in such a manner that it is impossible
to separate any one from the other two. It is certainly possible, and it is even most
advisable, to undertake three different philosophical studies of the law. Each
one of them should analyze the law primarily from one of these three viewpoints.
Thus, philosophic knowledge of the law as value gives rise to a juridical deontology; the philosophical analysis of the law as fact develops an insight into the
law as a cultural phenomenon; and consideration of the law as norm produces
a juridical epistemology. Nevertheless, there is no possibility of an absolute
separation among these three dimensions, because each one of them necessarily
includes a reference to the other two. Any legal norm includes a reference to a
factual situation, as well as a reference to values. Any legal fact involves references to norms and to values. All legal values are necessarily related to the
factual situation in which they must be materialized and point toward the normative instrument through which they have to be realized.
The first theme of the juridical axiology deals with the problem of the
relationship between value, obligation, and purpose. A purpose is a value that is
set up and recognized as a motive for conduct. Values are the ultimate ends,
those which cannot further be taken as mere means. Values are the basis for
ends or purposes. Axiology is the foundation of teleology. While Reale agrees
with Nicolai Hartmann as to the distinction between the absolute oughtness of
values and their positive or present obligation, he disagrees with him on two
points. Reale does not think that values are mere ideas. Nor does he think
that there can be values indifferent to existence, to reality, because every value
manifests itself through history, renewing itself constantly. Values manifest
themselves in the concrete reality of man, who is the only reality in which ontology
and axiology merge. Man is only insofar as he is subject to an obligation; and
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he is subject to an obligation only insofar as he is what he is. Value, obligation,
and purpose are steps in the unity of a process, which, in spite of many zigzags,
always conforms to the ideal of adequation between reality and value.
Values are perceived, says Reale, through a process of an emotional character.
Therefore, values cannot be entirely reduced to rational formulae. There is,
however, something rational in the field of values, insofar as values function as
support for ends, which are rationally fixed; and, moreover, there is rationality
also in the relationship between ends and means. Values are the possibility that
I can act insofar as I have chosen them as ends of my acting. And values are the
possibilities which the historical environment offers me through my consciousness
of this environment. Consequently, values are variable. Yet values have a relative objectivity, which is guaranteed by the very structure of both consciousness
and environment. The fact that Reale deems values to be variable does not
mean that he is a skeptic or a relativist, because he considers the human person
as the possibility of choosing values, as the "source-value." There is a change in
the content of values, because there is change in the basic possibilities which mind,
in its historic development, offers to knowledge and will. Throughout and
beneath all this change, however, there is a permanent metaphysical necessity:
the metaphysical necessity of a value, which, even having a variable content,
makes it possible for the other values to coexist within the historical environment
determined by these values. Justice, the ultimate goal of the law, is precisely
that value whose function consists in making possible the orderly realization of
other values.
Paulo Dorado de Gusmao,'128 a brilliant young professor at the University of
Brazil (Rio de Janeiro), develops a legal doctrine on the basis of a philosophy of
culture. He views culture as a man-built world related to values. The law is a
part of culture, and, therefore, it changes according to the change of cultural
values. There is not a single form of expression for juridical values, since they
can be defined only with reference to certain historic conditions. But all the
expressions of juridical values can be reduced to two basic values: justice and
legal security. Justice is variable in accordance with social change, whereas legal
security is more stable, because it always requires order, peace, authority, efficacy,
and guarantees. In addition to the juridical values, there are other goods which
can be taken as contents for the law: social, individual, and cultural goods.
Conflicts may arise among these different values. Such conflicts must be solved
by the specific juridical values, whose function precisely consists in establishing
an order and hierarchy among the goods protected by the law.
A legal theory also on the ground of a relativist philosophy of culture is
developed by Wilson de Souza Campos Batalha, 12 9 a judge in Sao Paulo; and
a similar doctrine, which lays particular stress on the economic factors, is pre-
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sented by Hermes Lima, 1 3 0 a professor of jurisprudence at the University of
Brazil (Rio de Janeiro).
The contribution of Renato Cirell Gzerna 13 1 (Sio Paulo) shows a certain
influence of the historicism of Croce and Gentile. Though laying stress upon the
historical character of justice, he thinks that justice also possesses an absolute
dimension. Thus, the main problem consists in clarifying how justice can be
historical and absolute at one and the same time.
Praiseworthy mention must be made also of other Brazilian legal thinkers:
Goffredo Telles,13 2 who takes as foundation Bergson's theory of free will; Luiz
Washington Vita, 1 33 author of some excellent studies; Theofilo Cavalcanti
(Filho),134 Nelson de Sousa Sampaio,1 3 5 Pinto Ferreira, 136 and A. Machado
Pauperio,1 37 the four of them especially concerned with the philosophy of public
law and political science; Mario Lins, 13 8 particularly devoted to the sociological
aspect; and Alipio Silveira 13 9 and Zecchi Abrahao, 140 both authors of important
studies on legal interpretation.
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